Do you trust the new 'paperless' voting machines? 
Read this testimony of an Anne Arundel County election judge.

Chairman Hixon and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to express support for House Bill 53 as well as to thank Delegate Karen Montgomery for her hard, and I believe courageous, work.

What I believe we are talking about today is insuring the voter’s intent is ACCURATELY captured and recorded.

I am a 33-year resident of Maryland and a registered voter. In addition, I have been a member of the Anne Arundel County Board of Election Supervisors. I was a member of that Board when the optic scanning equipment was first brought into Anne Arundel County. I voted FOR its acquisition because I believed the paper ballot which it required was a great insurance policy for honest elections.

I have worked as a Chief Election Judge for over 18 years in a number of precincts. To date, none of them my own.

The issue of a separate, independent voter verifiable paper audit trail, or paper ballot, has been of great concern and importance to me as well as to many members of the Republican Women of Anne Arundel County (RWAAC). Last October, members of the Republican Women of Anne Arundel County voted UNANIMOUSLY against the use of any voting equipment that did not provide the voters with an independently verifiable audit trail.

Incorporated by reference and attached to my testimony are copies of letters which the Republican Women of Anne Arundel County have sent to Governor Ehrlich.

I believe we can all agree that in financial affairs "audit trails" serve a very important and useful function – they make embezzlement harder to get away with. The paper ballots marked by the voters and counted in front of the voter by a computer, the optic scanners, also serve this same purpose. They make it much more difficult to steal elections – and get away with it.

I believe the issue of insuring honest elections reaches across all political spectrums and should bring us together as sisters and brothers working to accomplish the same end – insuring the survival of our form of democracy. It’s not who votes that counts. It’s who counts the votes that really matters.

As a taxpayer, I believe it is also appropriate for me to be concerned about the costs of acquiring this "new technology." When the optic scanning machines were in use, one machine was required for each of Maryland’s 1,600 precincts. The touch screen machines require 16,000 machines to service these same 1,600 precincts.

In March 2002, Maryland purchased 5,000 touch screen machines from Diebold for $17 million or approximately $3,400.00 per machine. Diebold has supplied Maryland with an additional 11,000 machines for an additional $55.6 million, or $5,054.55 per machine. San Diego County, California election officials purchased 10,000 machines in late December 2003 for $28 million, or approximately $2,800.00 per machine. These San Diego machines will include auditable paper trail technology. It would appear that negotiating contracts favorable to the Maryland taxpayers is NOT the strong suit of the Maryland State Board of Elections.

I also want to call your attention to a November 21, 2003 Press Release issued by the California Secretary of State. In this release, Secretary Shelley advised that beginning July 1, 2005, no California county or city may purchase a touch screen voting system that does not include a Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT). Secretary Shelley went on to say that as of July 2006, all touch screen voting systems used in California, regardless of when they were purchased, must have a VVPAT. Although not noted in this Press Release, in order to do voter equipment business with California, companies will be required to have background checks done on their programmers. No background check, no paper trail, no business from California. Secretary Shelley has spoken very forcibly – and the voting machine manufacturers are paying attention.

To date, Maryland taxpayers have been sent a $72.6 million bill to pay for machines whose security remains questionable. This $72.6 million bill does not include the cost for the new Election Reform Program Management Office including a new Security Systems Administrator on staff within the Maryland State Board of Elections. Also, the costs do not include the Science Application International Corporation (SAIC) review or the $75,000.00 cost of the RABA Trusted Agent Report presented to your committee earlier this month.

Other costs such as upgrading electrical service which may be required at the various polling places, the purchase of surge protectors, printing of new training manuals, voter outreach and education, advertising, etc., are not included.

As a Chief Election Judge who has recently received training on the new Diebold Touch Screen voting machines, I have additional concerns. Although many of you may have received a demonstration of the new touch screen machines, I doubt you have been privy to setting them up. I want to draw your attention to three pages from a document dated October 20, 2003 prepared by Diebold for the Maryland State Board of Elections.

Figure 4-11 shows the "Transport Cart" now required. Figure 4-13 shows one stack of the machines loaded on the Transport Cart. In practice, there will be two stacks per transport cart. Figures 3-5 and 3-6 show the machines after we election judges have managed to get their legs extended and hopefully locked into place and the machines lifted up.

As a taxpayer, I must admit that I did feel a good deal better when I read Section 12, Insurance Requirements, of the contract signed by the SBE with Diebold’s parent company, Global Election Systems: "12.2 The contractor shall maintain a policy of general liability insurance that is of the proper type and of sufficient limits that the State or local jurisdiction, their officials, employees, agents, servants, guests and subcontractors are reasonably covered in the event of injury or death."

As a Chief Election Judge who watched a stack of five 50-pound machines begin to topple off of one of the transfer carts onto an elderly person, I still don’t feel very good. (Based on my experiences and those of my husband who is also a Chief Election Judge, I would estimate the average age of election judges is 55+. On Election Day, these individuals are now being asked to handle and assemble 2,000 pounds of equipment.)

Also, as a Chief Election Judge who has worked in a number of different precincts, I believe I have a very good understanding of what voters will and will not tolerate. Waiting in line is top on their list of "flash points". Using the optic scanners, our Book Judges would issue each qualified voter a paper ballot and the proper marking pen to use. The voter could mark their ballot standing against a wall, sitting on the floor, or using the privacy booth. With the touch screen machines, the voters MUST use the machine or leave the precinct without voting.

Diebold assures all of us that NO VOTES will be lost using their equipment. Based on my experience, I can assure each of you that some of your votes will disappear when voters come into the precinct and see long waiting lines at the machines. Those voters WILL vote WITH THEIR FEET!

The State Board of Elections has said that because of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) they were required to go to the touch-screen machines. HAVA does require all States to provide voting machines that are handicapped accessible. There is particular concern for visually impaired voters. Diebold makes a voting machine which provides earphones and a key pad for use by the blind or visually impaired. To comply with this HAVA requirement, would only call for one handicapped unit per precinct.

HAVA does NOT require the State to use touch screen machines or have uniformity of election equipment. The State Board of Elections acknowledges this in their State Plan dated May 14, 2003, "For example, the State has passed legislation requiring uniform statewide voting systems by 2006. HAVA does not require statewide voting system uniformity, and therefore the Maryland legislation could be considered more rigorous than HAVA." (Section 1D, 304, Minimum Requirements" page 25.)

As a point of fact, if the State were to adhere to its own dictum, optic scanners with their paper ballots would be THE ONLY WAY TO GO. Why? Absentee ballots must continue to be voted by using a paper ballot counted by the optic scanners.

Diebold also touts the fact that their machines can be programmed for multiple languages. I submit that printing presses have had the capability of printing documents in many languages for many years. In fact, the first printing press printed a bible written in German.

In one of the precincts where I have served as a Chief Election Judge, there is a well-known and respected voter who can neither read nor write. His son always helps him. This gentleman would be unable to use the key-pad provided for the handicapped. That technology would be beyond his capabilities.

As members of the House Ways and Means Committee, I know funding is a major concern of yours as it should be.

In its State Plan, dated May 14, 2003, the SBE noted:

Section 18, of the SBE Contract 2001-01 "Non-availability of Funding" speaks to the issue of the General Assembly failing to appropriate funds. However, given all the legitimate concerns expressed by technical experts regarding the reliability of this touch screen equipment, I would suggest the General Assembly take a close look at that part of the contract which states, "The performance of work under this Contract may be terminated by the State . . .whenever the State shall determine that such termination is in the best interest of the State."

The Johns Hopkins University review, dated July 23, 2003:

"Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security standards applicable in other contexts."

The Security Applications International Corporation (SAIC) review, dated September 2, 2003:

"Executive Summary: The system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology is at high risk of compromise. Application of the listed mitigations will reduce the risk to the system." (Underscoring provided.)

I remind you that the SAIC report didn’t say the corrective actions which they recommended would ELIMINATE the risks – merely reduce them.

The RABA Trusted Agent Report dated January 20, 2004 recently presented to this Committee stated:

"The State of Maryland election system (comprising technical, operational, and procedural components), as configured at the time of this report, contains security risks that can cause moderate to severe disruption in an election. . . .we strongly feel that additional actions must be taken to mitigate increasing risks incumbent on a system that will receive broad scrutiny. Ultimately we feel there will be a need for paper receipts, at least in a limited fashion."

As you know all too well, the RABA review was done AFTER the Maryland State Board of Elections had received recommendations for corrective action from SAIC in September. This SAIC review was instigated in response to the Johns Hopkins report issued in July. As of January 20, 2004, significant security problems remained.

I want to invite your attention to the last two paragraphs of a January 5, 2004 Washington Times article.

A company that has asked us to trust their computer programming skills but which can’t even protect their own internal information from hackers leaves a lot to be desired in my view!

Many of you were present when Dr. Wertheimer of RABA responded to a question by noting that the way the Maryland elections were now being run, an individual using a telephone could call in from outside the United States, access the mainframe computer, alter our election results – and leave no trace. I found that statement alarming because I knew it was accurate and not said in jest.

Thank you for your consideration of HB53. I urge you to vote it favorably out of Committee. I also urge each of you to contact other members of the Legislature and urge them to vote FOR this bill as well as FOR Senate Bill 393.

Your election and our liberties are at stake.

Attachments:

1. RWAAC letter to Governor Ehrlich, w/attachment dated October 29, 2003

2. RWAAC letter to Governor Ehrlich, dated January 12, 2004, Re: Voting Machines – Costs"

3. RWAAC letter to Governor Ehrlich, w/attachments dated January 12, 2004, Re: Voting Machines – the Need for a Voter Verifiable Independent Paper Audit Trail"

4. Pages 21, 60 and 61 from Diebold prepared manual dated October 20, 2003 entitled, "State Board of Elections, AccuVote Touch Screen Voting System – Phase II, Implementation: AccuVote-TS Operations.

5. November 18, 2003, Baltimore Sun editorial, "Computer Trouble."

6. December 22, 2003, Washington Post editorial, "Trust in Voting Machines"

7. January 5, 2004, Washington Times article, "Paper Trail of Votes Omitted"

8. November 21, 2003, News Release from the California Secretary of State, Kevin Shelley, "Secretary of State Kevin Shelley Announces Directives to Ensure Voter Confidence in Electronic Systems."